

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

STEPHEN JEROME WILLIAMS ,  
CDCR #P-77060,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LARRY SMALL, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil No. 09-1957 MMA (RBB)

**ORDER:**

**(1) GRANTING MOTION TO  
PROCEED *IN FORMA PAUPERIS*,  
[Doc. No. 2]; and**

**(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING  
COMPLAINT FOR FAILING  
TO STATE A CLAIM  
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.  
§§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A**

Stephen Jerome Williams (“Plaintiff”), a state inmate currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison located in Calipatria, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not prepaid the \$350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed *In Forma Pauperis* (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2].

**I.**

**MOTION TO PROCEED IFP**

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of \$350. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

1 only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). *See Rodriguez v.*  
2 *Cook*, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP  
3 remains obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is  
4 ultimately dismissed. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); *Taylor v. Delatoore*, 281 F.3d 844, 847  
5 (9th Cir. 2002).

6 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a  
7 prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account  
8 statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately  
9 preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); *Andrews v. King*, 398 F.3d 1113,  
10 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial  
11 payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or  
12 (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,  
13 unless the prisoner has no assets. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The  
14 institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20%  
15 of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds \$10, and  
16 forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. *See* 28 U.S.C.  
17 § 1915(b)(2).

18 The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust account statement  
19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. *Andrews*, 398 F.3d at 1119.  
20 Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows he has insufficient funds with which to pay any initial  
21 partial filing fee. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be  
22 prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the  
23 reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay [an] initial partial filing  
24 fee.”); *Taylor*, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve”  
25 preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack  
26 of funds available.”).

27 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2], and  
28 assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire \$350

1 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court  
 2 pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

## 3 II.

### 4 SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

5 The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding  
 6 IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused  
 7 of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or  
 8 conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as  
 9 practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these  
 10 provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof,  
 11 which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who  
 12 are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; *Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-  
 13 27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); *Resnick v. Hayes*, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000)  
 14 (§ 1915A); see also *Barren v. Harrington*, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing  
 15 § 1915A).

16 “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all  
 17 allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the  
 18 plaintiff.” *Resnick*, 213 F.3d at 447; *Barren*, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)  
 19 “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s  
 20 duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see *Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.*,  
 21 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” *Ferdik v.*  
 22 *Bonzelet*, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). However, in giving liberal interpretation to a  
 23 pro se civil rights complaint, the court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were  
 24 not initially pled.” *Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska*, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th  
 25 Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations  
 26 are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” *Id.*

27 Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person  
 28 acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

1 the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the  
 2 United States. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1983; *Parratt v. Taylor*, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), *overruled on*  
 3 *other grounds by Daniels v. Williams*, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); *Haygood v. Younger*, 769 F.2d  
 4 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

#### 5 **A. Excessive Force Claims**

6 Plaintiff alleges that he was “illegally in possession of a cellular telephone” when prison  
 7 officials came to his cell on February 26, 2009. *See* Compl. at 5. He further alleges that “before  
 8 complying with the order to ‘cuff up.’ [Plaintiff] grabbed the cell phone,” removed the memory  
 9 card, and “placed it in my mouth, chewed it and swallowed it.” *Id.* After Plaintiff swallowed  
 10 the memory card, Defendant Bustamonte is alleged to have sprayed Plaintiff with pepper spray.  
 11 *Id.*

12 When an inmate claims that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by  
 13 using excessive force, the relevant inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort  
 14 to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” *Hudson v.*  
 15 *McMillian*, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). An Eighth Amendment violation occurs only when an inmate  
 16 is subjected to the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” *Whitley v. Albers*, 475 U.S. 312,  
 17 319 (1986). To determine whether Plaintiff has satisfied the malicious and sadistic standard, the  
 18 Court examines the following five factors: (1) the extent of the injury suffered; (2) the need for  
 19 the application of force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4)  
 20 the threat reasonably perceived by Defendants; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity  
 21 of a forceful response. *Hudson*, 503 U.S. at 7; *Whitley*, 475 U.S. at 321.

22 Here, Plaintiff’s facts fail to show that the actions of the Defendants rises to the level of  
 23 “malicious and sadistic.” *Id.* Plaintiff admits to attempting to hide contraband and failed to  
 24 obey the orders of the officers that came to his cell. No other force is alleged to be used against  
 25 Plaintiff other than Plaintiff’s allegations that they used pepper spray. The facts, even taken in  
 26 the light most favorable to Plaintiff, demonstrate that the pepper spray was used “in a good faith  
 27 effort to restore discipline and order and not maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose  
 28 of causing harm.” *Clement v. Gomez*, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, Plaintiff’s

1 Eighth Amendment excessive force claims are dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which  
2 § 1983 relief can be granted.

### 3 **B. Fourth Amendment Strip Search Claims**

4 Plaintiff also alleges that despite the fact he had been caught swallowing contraband,  
5 there was “no penological need to conduct two (2) separate strip searches of [his] bodily  
6 cavities.” Compl. at 7. Generally, strip searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment rights  
7 of prisoners. *See Michenfelder v. Sumner*, 860 F.2d 328, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1988). However, strip  
8 searches that are “excessive, vindictive, harassing or unrelated to any legitimate penological  
9 interest,” may be unconstitutional. *Id.* at 332.

10 In his Complaint, Plaintiff admits to hiding contraband by swallowing it. *See* Compl. at  
11 5. The facts related to the initial strip search following Plaintiff’s admission that he was  
12 attempting to hide contraband fails to state a Fourth Amendment claim upon which relief may  
13 be granted.

### 14 **C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims**

15 Plaintiff claims that his due process rights were violated when prison officials failed to  
16 properly process his administrative grievances. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States  
17 Constitution provides that: “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,  
18 without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “The requirements of procedural  
19 due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth  
20 Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” *Board of Regents v. Roth*, 408 U.S. 564, 569  
21 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may grant prisoners liberty or property interests  
22 sufficient to invoke due process protection. *Meachum v. Fano*, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976).  
23 Thus, to state a procedural due process claim, Plaintiff must allege: “(1) a liberty or property  
24 interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; [and]  
25 (3) lack of process.” *Wright v. Riveland*, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000).

26 To the extent Plaintiff challenges the procedural adequacy of CDCR inmate grievance  
27 procedures, his Complaint fails to state a due process claim. This is because the Ninth Circuit  
28 has held that prisoners have no protected *property* interest in an inmate grievance procedure

1 arising directly from the Due Process Clause. *See Mann v. Adams*, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.  
 2 1988) (finding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment creates “no legitimate  
 3 claim of entitlement to a [prison] grievance procedure”); *accord Adams v. Rice*, 40 F.3d 72, 75  
 4 (4th Cir. 1994) (1995); *Buckley v. Barlow*, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993)

5 In addition, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show that any named prison  
 6 official deprived him of a protected *liberty* interest by allegedly failing to respond to his prison  
 7 grievances in a satisfactory manner. While a liberty interest can arise from state law or prison  
 8 regulations, *Meachum*, 427 U.S. at 223-27, due process protections are implicated only if  
 9 Plaintiff alleges facts to show that Defendants: (1) restrained his freedom in a manner not  
 10 expected from his sentence, and (2) “impose[d] atypical and significant hardship on [him] in  
 11 relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” *Sandin v. Conner*, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995);  
 12 *Neal v. Shimoda*, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff pleads no facts to suggest how  
 13 the allegedly inadequate review and consideration of his inmate grievances amounted to a  
 14 restraint on his freedom not contemplated by his original sentence or how they resulted in an  
 15 “atypical” and “significant hardship.” *Sandin*, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s  
 16 Fourteenth Amendment due process claims are dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which  
 17 § 1983 relief can be granted.

18 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed sua sponte for failing to  
 19 state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B). *See*  
 20 *Lopez*, 203 F.3d at 1126-27.

#### 21 IV.

#### 22 CONCLUSION AND ORDER

23 Good cause appearing therefor, **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that:

24 1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]  
 25 is **GRANTED**.

26 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that:


27 2. Plaintiff’s Complaint is **DISMISSED** without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
 28 §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A. However, Plaintiff is **GRANTED** forty five (45) days leave from

1 the date this Order is filed in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the  
2 deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must be complete in itself  
3 without reference to the superseded pleading. *See* S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not  
4 named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. *See*  
5 *King v. Atiyeh*, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff's Amended Complaint  
6 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further  
7 leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). *See*  
8 *McHenry v. Renne*, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996).

9 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved § 1983 form complaint to  
10 Plaintiff.

11 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

12 DATED: October 30, 2009

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14 Hon. Michael M. Anello  
15 United States District Judge  
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